Türkiye’s Role in European defense: The SAFE Regulation
- Dilay Kuyucak
- 3 days ago
- 3 min read
In March 2025, the European Commission presented a White Paper for European defense along with a financial instrument under the Re-Arm Europe package to help countries invest in key defense areas called Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation. The instrument will provide up to 150 billion euros in loans to member states for urgent, large-scale defense investment. The launch followed the USA’s suspension of military aid in the face of growing Russian aggression, pushing Europe to take action to strengthen their defense industry. The SAFE Regulation is expected to be ratified on May 27, following the council vote.
SAFE is established under Article 122 of the TFEU—normally used for crisis assistance—allowing the Council to fast-track loans. To qualify, the projects submitted by member states must involve at least two EU buyers acting jointly. A minimum of 65% of project value must be sourced from the EU/EEA or Ukraine, meaning non-EU suppliers can only provide up to 35% unless covered by a Security & Defense Partnership Agreement. While SAFE doesn’t directly lend to non-EU states, procurement is open to third-country firms if the EU signs partnership agreements with “like-minded” countries (acceding, candidate, potential candidates, or partners), in which the “Buy-European” threshold can be relaxed.

Türkiye emerges as a strategic partner for Europe both due to its membership in NATO, with the second-largest military in the organization, and its geopolitical importance, situated between Europe and Asia. European Commission defense spokesperson Thomas Regnier explained that “countries like Türkiye can immediately contribute up to 35% of a defense product.” The growing Turkish defense industry had exports totaling 6.3 billion euros in 2024, and Turkish companies like Baykar produce to NATO standards. Türkiye is also a partner of the European Sky Shield Initiative, a project to build a ground-based integrated European air defense system. An agreement between the Italian Leonardo and Turkish Baykar on advanced drones is expected to serve as a blueprint for how joint procurement within the SAFE regulation could work.
Türkiye’s participation in European defense raises questions on both sides. On the European side, Greece has raised formal concerns about Türkiye’s involvement in SAFE. Normally any formal defense partnership with a third country would require unanimous consent of EU member states; however, with the SAFE regulation, third-party participation in the EU defense industry would be allowed by a qualified majority. Athens will seek to enforce a clear definition of “like-minded” countries to contest this, hoping to exclude Türkiye. Greece has also aligned with France to push for a reduction of the third-party share from 35% to 15%. Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis said on May 22 that if Türkiye wishes to access European defense financing tools, it should lift the 30-year war threat “casus belli,” cause for war if Greece unilaterally expanded its territorial waters beyond six nautical miles in the Aegean Sea.
With the recent developments in Türkiye following the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the EU has to balance its urgent security needs with its core values. İmamoğlu - the likely candidate for the 2028 presidential elections - was arrested on March 19 on charges of corruption and terrorism and is considered worldwide as an attempt to ban opposition under Erdoğan’s regime and control the outcome of future elections. In the European Commission’s latest enlargement report, a lack of reforms concerning democracy and fundamental rights was identified, and the presidential system was qualified by a lack of checks and balances. This situation is only amplified through the erasure of opposing forces to the regime and the instrumentalisation of justice. Türkiye’s involvement in European defense is also considered a move forward towards EU membership; however, Nacho Sánchez Amor, the European Parliament’s Turkey rapporteur, told The Parliament that “the more Turkey is treated as a partner, the less it is seen as a potential member.”
Edited by: Yağmur Ece Nisanoğlu, Ömer Gökce