Turkish Constitutional Court Targets Post-Divorce Poverty Alimony

On June 4, 2026, the phrase “indefinitely” was annulled from the provision governing post-divorce poverty alimony by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Türkiye. While the ruling was passed by a majority vote of 12 to 3, it triggered controversy as critics found it non-consequential and feeding into the long-standing anti-feminist agenda. Its entry into force was further postponed by nine months, for the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, the national parliament, to introduce replacement legislation.

Article 175 of the Turkish Civil Code allows either of the former spouses who would fall into poverty after divorce to seek a set amount of financial support from the other spouse, provided that the claimant is not more at fault for the marital dissolution, and the amount is in proportion to the financial capacity of the paying spouse.

Two competing media narratives have shaped Turkish public perception of the ruling, according to a gender-studies analysis from Koç University. The dominant one frames alimony as a lifelong, excessive burden imposed unfairly on men. A less prevalent narrative frames it as a limited protection mechanism for women who leave marriage in a weaker economic position after years of unpaid domestic and care work.

The provision itself is gender neutral, contrary to its common portrayal in Turkish mainstream and social media. Either former spouse may claim poverty alimony under the same statutory conditions, and courts assess every application on the same basis: the claimant's risk of poverty, the parties' relative fault, and the paying spouse's financial means.

Under the existing system, an eligible former spouse can request alimony without a predetermined end date, and courts continue to track eligibility for as long as the award stands. Either side can apply to increase, reduce, or terminate the award when circumstances change.

The Constitutional Court's ruling removes only the statutory basis for awarding alimony without a fixed expiry date; the judicial procedure itself remains unchanged.

According to the Turkish Civil Code, the word “indefinitely” cannot lawfully generate an unconditional obligation that lasts under the recipient’s death. Under Article 176 of the Turkish Civil Code, alimony automatically ends when the recipient remarries or the former spouse dies. Courts also terminate the award in cases of a change in legal eligibility, which primarily include the claimant’s position in relation to the poverty threshold, the paying spouse’s financial means, and the claimant’s updated de facto or de jure marital status.

The Constitutional Court drew the same distinction in 2012, when it rejected an earlier challenge from the Kestel Civil Court of First Instance, ruling that an indefinite award continues only as long as the statutory conditions remain in place. The phrase pointed to the absence of a predetermined endpoint, not an irreversible lifetime obligation, and stayed subject to judicial review throughout.

The Court’s reasoned judgment had not been published when the outcome was announced, according to the Anadolu Agency, indicating that its precise constitutional grounds remained unclear. Legal commentary following the decision has focused largely on property rights, proportionality, and the burden that an open-ended obligation may place on the paying spouse, particularly after a short marriage. Those concerns are also reflected in the argument that led the Antalya 12th Family Court to refer to the provision for constitutional review.

Short marriages are routinely cited as proof that open-ended alimony is inherently disproportionate, but the existing law already requires courts to assess genuine poverty risk, its connection to the marriage, the paying spouse’s capacity, and whether the need for support continues. Where two independently employed adults divorce after only a few months without developing economic dependence, those requirements should prevent an unjustified long-term award; if they do not, the unfairness reflects faulty judicial assessment or application rather than necessarily disproving the statutory possibility of open-ended support.

The property-rights reasoning fails because although the paying spouse is placed with a continuous financial obligation, the losses the recipient has absorbed through unpaid care work must be accounted for in such calculations, including reduced earnings, interrupted employment, lost promotions, and lower pension contributions. According to the OECD’s 2025 Economic Survey of Türkiye, women spend approximately four more hours per day than men on unpaid care and domestic work, twice the average gap across OECD countries.

Childcare, eldercare, and household work do not generate wages or pension records, while the other spouse may remain continuously employed and continue building professional experience, savings, and social-security entitlements. The same OECD survey identifies unequal care responsibilities and limited access to affordable childcare as major barriers to women’s participation in the labour market, even as women’s educational attainment has increased.

According to the Turkish Statistical Institute’s (TÜİK) marriage and divorce statistics, 193,793 couples divorced in Türkiye in 2025. Courts made custody decisions concerning 191,371 children in finalized divorce cases, awarding custody to mothers in 74.6 percent of the cases and to fathers in the remaining 25.4 percent, revealing the distribution of carework post-divorce.

An award of alimony also does not guarantee that the money will be received. According to the Women’s Solidarity Foundation’s extensive study across 16 provinces in 2024, 44 percent of the poverty-alimony awards examined were not paid. The practical question is therefore not only how long an award may continue, but whether recipients can collect it and obtain enforcement when payments are missed.

The shape of the new system rests with Parliament, which has nine months to draft replacement legislation. The most consequential choice is whether that legislation directs courts to weigh the length of the marriage, employment history, unpaid care work, pension losses, and realistic earning capacity, or whether it imposes a single deadline regardless of circumstance. The first approach would let courts distinguish between a brief marriage in which neither spouse depended economically on the other and a longer one in which a spouse spent years outside formal employment. The second would not.

The ruling does not address why post-divorce poverty arises in the first place. Affordable childcare, re-employment programmes, and stronger social protection reduce the economic cost of unpaid caregiving and reduce reliance on payments between former spouses; alimony does not. At the end, a reform that fixes only the duration of support, without these measures in place, leaves the highly criticized underlying imbalance in place.