How Does Rising Polarization Threaten Democratic Norms?

For the first time in its modern history, Japan’s ruling party has lost its parliamentary majority last week. While this has caused diverse speculations about the country’s political future like the resignation possibility of the prime minister, the more consequential story is not unique to Japan. Around the world, democracies are increasingly struggling with affective polarization, the growing emotional hostility between political partisans that undermines the values essential to democracy itself. Japan’s election is merely the latest flashpoint in a broader global crisis.

Affective polarization is distinct from ideological disagreement. Citizens in polarized countries do not just argue about policy; they view members of the other party as fundamentally immoral, dangerous, and undeserving of political rights. Research by The New Yorker demonstrates that even when policy preferences are not radically opposed, people cultivate intense dislike for the other side. This animosity erodes support for democratic norms: studies have found that when one’s own party is in power, voters are willing to see checks and balances weakened, while in opposition, they favor them only as a tool to constrain rivals. Democratic principles thus become partisan weapons rather than shared commitments.

Türkiye provides a stark illustration of this phenomenon. Among all major democracies, Türkiye is one of the most affectively polarized. Studies of the 2023 elections show how this polarization is deeply entwined with elite behavior. For years, the ruling party has portrayed opponents as existential threats to national unity rather than just political rivals by using divisive rhetoric. Because of this framing, voters have shown extraordinary partisan loyalty, refusing to criticize the ruling party despite economic crises and falling living standards. Due to political repression and media suppression, the opposition has grown increasingly polarized and is stuck in a defensive posture that exacerbates already existing divisions.

Based on pre-election surveys, recent research reveals an important dynamic: supporters of the ruling AKP were actually more affectively polarized than opposition voters in the run-up to the 2023 Turkish elections despite the norm. Extreme elite-driven mobilization and messaging that presented the opposition as a national threat were responsible for this increased polarization. However, polarization levels shift over time. Since the elections, CHP voters, still in opposition, have become more polarized, similar to patterns observed in the United States, where out-party supporters (currently Democrats) show stronger affective polarization than those holding power. Understanding these fluctuations is essential: it shows that polarization is tied to political power dynamics and elite framing, meaning efforts to reduce hostility must account for these context-dependent changes rather than treating polarization as a permanent trait of particular voter groups.

Comparative evidence from the United States reinforces this lesson. Voelkel and colleagues tested interventions aimed at reducing affective polarization, correcting misperceptions of out-party hostility, promoting cross-party friendships, and showcasing warm relationships between political leaders. These interventions successfully made participants feel less animosity toward their opponents. But most importantly, these efforts did not reduce anti-democratic attitudes: participants were no less likely to support undemocratic candidates or prioritize winning over democratic fairness, which reveals that while affective polarization and democratic erosion are related, reducing interpersonal hostility alone does not automatically restore democratic norms. Fear of losing power and elite-driven narratives continue to fuel anti-democratic behavior even when citizens feel less hostile to each other.

Recent research by Ohio State University finds that support for democratic norms flips depending on which party holds power. When their party controls the presidency, they oppose constraints that might limit their side’s power, but when out of power, they support the same constraints to weaken rivals. This responsiveness to elite cues shows that norm erosion is not purely an emotional reaction; it is also a rational, strategic calculation shaped by political leadership. Affective polarization makes citizens more susceptible to these cues by heightening perceptions of threat and moral difference, but even if hostility softens, elite messaging can sustain anti-democratic tendencies.

These findings converge on a sobering conclusion: affective polarization threatens democracy not simply because it makes people dislike each other, but because it enables elites to politicize fundamental rules of the game. Citizens tolerate violations of democratic norms as long as they have side benefits, eroding institutional safeguards over time. This dynamic is vividly visible in Türkiye, where polarization and authoritarian resilience have reinforced each other, but it is also evident in the United States and increasingly, as Japan’s recent election hints, in other advanced democracies facing populist surges.

Reversing this trend requires more than promoting interpersonal warmth between partisans. Efforts to counter polarization must address the structural incentives and elite strategies that keep citizens locked in a defensive, zero-sum mindset. Strengthening independent media and protecting civil society would allow opposition supporters to engage politically without the siege mentality that fuels intense polarization. Pre-election data, by revealing how polarization spikes among ruling-party or opposition voters depending on power dynamics, can guide interventions to prevent these shifts from permanently causing an undemocratic state. Similar strategies are required on a global scale. Reforming institutions to make democratic competition less existential is necessary to reduce affective polarization. Strong checks and balances, equitable districting, and proportional representation can all reduce the stakes of losing power. Leaders who use language that defies convention and paints opponents as national threats must answer for their actions. Rebuilding a shared democratic identity can be aided by civic education and cross-cutting social initiatives, but emotional reconciliation by itself won't be sufficient unless elite behavior and institutional incentives change.

Edited by: Ömer Gökce